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Abstract 
 
This paper is concerned with the question of why economic inequality has increased 
so dramatically in recent decades and what can be done about it. It suggests that the 
fundamental cause of the recent rise in economic inequality, underlying all the more 
proximate factors, is a major process of de-democratisation that has taken place since 
the 1970s, which has increased the political representation of capital while reducing 
that of labour. The paper pulls together a wide range of research from different 
disciplines in order to decisively show the ways in which economic governance has 
been de-democratised in this period. This analysis has important consequences with 
regard to policy attempts to reduce inequality and suggests that these must focus not 
on technical issues but on ways to strengthen democracy. And if the dynamics of de-
democratisation are fundamentally global, then solutions must also be global. These 
conclusions are in stark contrast with current academic and policy approaches which 
tend to focus on technical, rather than political, solutions, and which focus 
overwhelmingly at the national, rather than the global, level. This article thus calls for 
a major re-thinking of the causes of rising inequality and the policy changes needed 
to reduce it. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned with the question of why economic inequality has increased 
so dramatically in recent decades and what can be done about it. It suggests that the 
fundamental cause of the recent rise in economic inequality, underlying all of the more 
proximate factors, is a major process of de-democratisation that has taken place since 
the 1970s, which has increased the political representation of capital while reducing 
that of labour. The paper pulls together a wide range of research from different 
disciplines, which often do not speak to each other, in order to show clearly and 
decisively the ways in which economic governance has been radically de-
democratised in this period. This analysis has important consequences with regard to 
policy attempts to reduce inequality because in order to find solutions to a problem it 
is necessary to properly understand the root causes. And if the underlying cause of 
the rise in inequality is a diminishment of democracy then the solution must focus on 
ways to increase and strengthen democracy. And, as this paper further argues, if the 
dynamics of de-democratisation are fundamentally global, and play out in very many 
states in very similar ways, then solutions surely cannot be found at the national level 
alone but must also be sought at the global level. These conclusions are in stark 
contrast with current academic and policy approaches which tend to focus on 
technical, rather than political, solutions, and which focus overwhelmingly at the 
national, rather than the global, level. This article thus calls for a major re-thinking of 
the causes of rising inequality and the policy changes needed to reduce it. 
 
The work of a number of economists has documented the huge increase in inequality 
that has taken place in many parts of the world since the 1970s. The U-shaped graphs 
of twentieth century income inequality in various countries produced by Thomas 
Piketty have quickly become famous. These graphs show a downward trend in income 
inequality from the start of the twentieth century until around 1970 and then a sharp 
upturn in inequality after that such that income inequality in 2010 is very similar to that 
in 1910. These trends are particularly marked in the Anglo-Saxon countries (US, UK, 
Australia and Canada) and in middle income emerging countries such as India, China. 
Argentina, Columbia, South Africa and Indonesia (Piketty 2014). 
 
 
Understanding this recent rise in inequality has become a major concern in a number 
of academic fields and there are many competing theories offering explanations for 
this sudden change in inequality trends. For Piketty the reduction in inequality in the 
early and mid part of the twentieth century was just an anomaly brought about by two 
world wars and unusual political conditions. His book suggests that in the normal 
functioning of capitalism there is a continual increase in inequality because the rate of 
return on capital is greater than the rate of growth, which he sums up with the equation 
r > g. Scheve and Stasavage also argue that the post-war years were somewhat 
anomalous and develop the idea that the reduction in inequality in this period was due 
to the increased taxation and redistribution that governments were able to implement 
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because of the changed social and moral calculus that came after the experience of 
mass warfare such that it became politically possible to tax the rich as a form of 
compensation because they generally did not fight in the war (Scheve & Stasavage 
2016). In both of these approaches it is assumed that rising inequality is the norm and 
that what needs to be explained is the period where inequality declined. The post-
1970s rise in inequality, then, is just back to business as normal. 
 
Other theories focus on technological and economic changes to explain the upturn in 
inequality in the post-1970s period. Popular views include the idea that the increase 
in inequality is largely a result of skill-biased technological change, such as 
computerisation, that has led to increased wages for skilled workers and decreased 
wages for the unskilled (Brune & Garrett 2005:416). Others emphasize the huge 
increase in wages of CEOs and senior management in large corporations, the 
wealthiest 1%, whose salary and benefit levels have skyrocketed in the past few 
decades (Atkinson & Piketty 2010, Essletzzbicher 2015). And yet others have argued 
that various features of economic globalisation, such as increases in foreign direct 
investment and trade liberalisation, have led to increased inequalities, particularly in 
developing countries (Arbache et al 2004, Basu & Guariglia 2007, Cornia & Court 
2001, Topalova 2004). 
 
Whilst there is no doubt much truth in many of these theories, in this paper I argue that 
they all focus on proximate causes and that in so doing they all miss the fundamental 
cause that underlies all these other factors. Only by stepping back and looking at the 
big picture is it possible to more completely understand the drivers of rising inequality. 
And this is best done by exploring the broader political shifts in economic governance 
that have taken place in the past 50 years. This paper thus seeks to bring together a 
wide range of information and scholarship from a number of disciplines into one overall 
and accessible assessment in order to look critically at the changes in political 
representation, policy making and the functioning of democracy in the post-1970s era 
and to explore how these changes may be playing a part in the contemporary upswing 
of inequality. 
 
In what follows I will first outline some of the theoretical discussions that have taken 
place regarding the relationship between democracy and inequality, and then briefly 
outline some of the major politico-economic changes that have taken place since the 
1970s, namely neoliberalism, globalization and financialization. The main section then 
considers a number of ways that these changes have led to a transformation of 
democracy, and in particular the de-democratisation of economic policy making. The 
conclusion will consider the implications of these changes for inequality trends and for 
the type of action that must be taken if levels of inequality are to be reduced. 
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1. Democracy and Inequality – Theoretical and Empirical 
Perspectives  
 
There is a long history of the idea that increasing democracy will lead to a decrease in 
inequality. Nineteenth century elites resisted universal suffrage for this very reason, 
fearing that an impoverished majority would surely vote to appropriate their wealth and 
redistribute it more equally (Boix 2003, Dunn 2005). The ‘redistributionist threat’ of 
democracy was often expressed in terms of its incompatibility with private property. 
James Madison wrote in The Federalist, no 10 that “democracies have ever been 
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with 
personal security and private property”. Similarly Thomas Macaulay in his speech on 
the Chartists in 1842 expressed the view that universal suffrage would inevitably lead 
to “the end of property and thus of all civilisation” (cited in Przeworski 2006).  
 
There are three basic mechanisms by which the reduction in inequality can be 
expected to occur. Firstly, as exemplified in social conflict theory and median voter 
models, it is suggested that democracy will reduce inequality because median voters 
will vote for redistribution by taxes and transfers (eg. Meltzer & Richard 1981, 
Acemoglu & Robinson 2000).  Secondly, it is expected that since in democracies 
politicians have to compete for citizen support they will tend to provide more and better 
public services in order to win votes. Since the provision of public services will 
disproportionately benefit the poor, and also improve their ability to compete in the 
market place, this process drives the reduction of inequality (eg Saint-Paul & Verdier 
1993, Morgan & Kelly 2013). Thirdly, democracies have features that empower 
workers and facilitate their involvement in the political process. Thus democracies 
allow freedom of association and collective bargaining and this can lead to increases 
in workers’ wages, thus leading to a reduction in inequality (eg. Rodrik 1998).  
 
However, against these theoretical expectations, attempts to show an empirical 
connection between democracy and inequality have been surprisingly inconclusive. 
Scholars using different data sets and different methodologies have not been able to 
come to an agreement about any general connection between democracy and 
inequality. Some scholars appear to find a correlation (eg. Chong 2001, Reuveny & Li 
2003), while others do not (eg. Ross 2006, Sirowy & Inkeles 1990, Timmons 2010).  
These studies use quantitative methods to compare a large number of different 
contexts of democratization. The inconclusiveness of the results in these types of 
study has led some scholars to move to a more historical and qualitative approach, 
investigating particular historical episodes and undertaking an analysis of the specific 
political and economic dynamics at play (Capoccia & Ziblat 2010, Gradstein & 
Milanovic 2004).  
 
From these studies a general pattern begins to emerge– the democratization of 
Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did indeed lead to a significant 
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reduction in economic inequality (Gradstein & Milanovic 2004). However, 
democratization that took place in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the so-called 
‘third wave’ of democratization in the 1980s and 90s (Huntingdon 1993) did not lead 
to a reduction in inequality and in fact in many cases led to an increase in inequality 
(Timmons 2010:735-6). While such a difference between these two different historical 
periods would explain why the regression analyses that combine many cases spread 
across different periods fail to find a correlation, it does not explain why these two very 
different patterns exist. Indeed, at first sight it appears rather paradoxical that the 
recent rise in inequality has taken place at the same time as a major spread of 
democracy worldwide.  
 
Another body of literature has explored the connections between democracy and 
inequality in a different way. This literature has sought to explain the differing degrees 
of inequality that are exhibited in the long-existing European and American 
democracies. Some of these democracies have large welfare states, high levels of 
redistribution and relatively lower levels of inequality (such as those in continental 
Europe and Scandinavia), while others have much smaller welfare states, low levels 
of redistribution and correspondingly higher levels of inequality (such as the US and 
the UK). This suggests that there is no immediate or automatic connection between 
democracy and inequality and rather invites us to look more carefully at the political 
processes by which democratic politics shapes distribution and redistribution. Recent 
scholarship suggests that party political ideology, institutional features and electoral 
systems all significantly affect levels of economic inequality (Hibbs 1987, Iversen & 
Soskice 2006, 2008, 2009). A major theme across much of this literature is that the 
redistributive differences in democracies are fundamentally due to the relative 
strengths of labour and capital as they are shaped by, and play out, in the political 
process (Korpi 1983, 2006; Huber & Stephens 2001). 
 
Despite their differences, all of these approaches share in common a theoretical 
framework that assumes a closed economy, such that issues of democracy and 
inequality can be explored by solely focusing on domestic actors and processes. While 
such an assumption may have been plausible during the post-war years of ‘embedded 
liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982), when capital controls limited the global flow of capital and 
states were able to set their own economic and social priorities while trading with other 
states at arm’s length, it is clearly not plausible in the post-1970s period in which 
capital flows have become increasing global. In the context of economic and financial 
globalization it is necessary to develop a broader, more transnational, political 
economic analysis of actors, interests and strategies (Albertus & Menaldo 2013). In 
other words, it is necessary to place debates about inequality and democracy in the 
context of globalisation (Freeman and Quinn 2012). 
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2. Global Changes in the post-1970s Era: Neoliberalism, 
Globalisation and Financialisation  
 
Neoliberal globalisation was initiated in the 1970s as a response to the slow down in 
economic growth, high inflation and the associated crisis of accumulation. In this crisis 
situation industrialists, investors and politicians all looked for new ways to stimulate 
growth. 
 
It was in this context that the Keynesian paradigm which had dominated economic 
policy since the war came to be questioned and was finally replaced by neoliberalism, 
and particularly by the ideas of Hayek. A fundamental idea of neoliberalism is that ‘the 
economy’ is scientific and neutral and that the dynamics of growth are a technical 
matter that can be understood and modelled by calculations and formulae. In contrast 
to the socially embeddedness of Keynesianism in which efforts are made so that the 
economy serves the best interests of society, neoliberalism seeks to dis-embed the 
economy and have it function as a separate sphere. A key part of this is the idea that 
the ‘economic’ should to kept separate from the ‘political’. Whilst this idea can be found 
in all capitalist theory and practice, the divide between the economic and the political 
is taken to new extremes in neoliberalism. Political and institutional matters are seen 
as factors which block the smooth running of ‘the economy’ and thus neoliberalism 
calls for a re-structuring of the state in order to increasingly free the economic from 
political constraints. This idea, as I will discuss more below, has been fundamental in 
the post 1970s restructuring of the state. And in the process, I will argue, it has led to 
the removal of large areas of economic policy making from democratic oversight (Cox 
1992). 
 
Hayek devoted considerable attention to the question of democracy and his relation 
to it was rather ambivalent. While he claimed to be in favour of democracy he also 
believed that it could lead to unhelpful interference in the workings of the economy. 
Thus for Hayek, democracy was only acceptable if it was ‘limited’. By this he meant 
that there should be constitutional limitations such that most economic matters would 
be carefully bracketed out of democratic control. In particular, he argued that 
governments should not have the right to raise taxes for the purpose of redistribution, 
and he argued strongly against any notion of ‘social justice’. In essence, his ideas 
about constitutional limits to democracy were effectively ways to ensure that the 
economic sphere would be carefully insulated from the demos and thus that 
democracy’s redistributive threat would be neutralized (Hayek 1973, 1982, Pierson 
1992). As we shall see, there have been many changes in this direction in the post-
1970s period. 
 
Another important aspect of neoliberal thought was that the economy was 
fundamentally universal and therefore should not be geographically limited in any way. 
Thus the globalisation of capital and its free movement worldwide was something that 
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neoliberals actively sought to achieve. So it is important to remember that economic 
globalization, as it occurred in the post-1970s period, was not something that was 
purely driven by new technological innovations or by market forces. It was rather the 
outcome of specific policies that were designed and implemented by neoliberals who 
were part of new transnational economic policy networks which also developed in the 
early 1970s. These networks, consisting of official organisations such as the IMF and 
the World Bank, informal networks such as the G7 finance ministers and central 
bankers, and private transnational policy networks such as the World Economic Forum 
and the Trilateral Commission, are largely responsible for the transnational process of 
consensus formation about global economic policy and the form of economic 
globalisation that we have today (Baker 2008, Carroll & Sapinksi 2010, Cox 1992, 
Miller 2010., Sklair 1997) 
 
Space precludes a detailed discussion of the nature of post-1970s economic 
globalisation but the key elements that are worth noting here are (a) the globalisation 
of production and with it the increase in the number and importance of transnational 
companies (TNCs) and the shift to post-Fordist approaches; (b) the globalisation of 
capital and the deregulation of capital markets such that capital can move increasingly 
freely around the world; and (c) the massive increase in the size and importance of 
the financial sector, which is now much larger than the real economy, and which has 
led to a new context of ‘financialisation’ where financial motives, financial institutions, 
and financial elites have become increasingly important in the operation of the 
economy and its governing institutions (Epstein 2002, Palley 2008).   
 
As we shall see, all of these processes, along with the increased globalisation of 
economic governance, have led to significant reductions in democracy. The next 
section seeks to explore how this has happened. 
 
3. Dynamics of De-democratisation 
 
A number of scholars have argued that globalization may sever the link between 
democracy and inequality, in particular by enabling asset-holders to move easily 
across borders in an effort to avoid redistribution, thereby preventing policymakers 
from taxing the rich in order to provide public services or transfers to the poor  (Boix 
2003, Dailami 2000, Freeman and Quinn 2012). While this is no doubt true, I think 
there is more going on than this. In order to understand the rise in inequality that has 
occurred in the post-1970s period of globalization it is necessary to look at the way 
that democracy itself has changed in this period. A basic tenet of democratic theory is 
that “the fate of a national community is largely in its own hands” (Held 1995:13). In 
the context of the neoliberal globalization of production and finance in the post-1970s 
period, this is becoming less and less the case. 
 
In what follows I will argue that globalization has led to a process of economic de-
democratisation in line with Hayek’s basic ideas. I am not claiming that there has been 
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a complete erosion of democracy, or that states have been washed away by global 
capital. Rather I will try to show that decisions regarding the organisation and 
functioning of economic matters have become less subject to democratic influence. I 
will discuss three major ways that this has happened – by the direct removal of certain 
economics matters from political control, by increasing restrictions on the policy 
options available to policy-makers, and by transformations in the structure of the 
policy-making process itself. 
  
 (1) Removing economic matters from direct political control 
 
The most obvious way that economic decision-making has become de-democratised 
has been the actual separation of major economic institutions and offices from political 
control. The most well-known example here is the increasing separation of central 
banks from political oversight. Since the mid-1990s the global economic policy 
consensus has been that central banks should be ‘independent’.  What this means, of 
course, is that central banks, and therefore monetary policy, should be insulated as 
much as possible from democratic reach. Central banks can be granted ‘operational 
independence’ or ‘goal independence’. In the former the politicians set the policy goals 
but give the central bank autonomy to choose the vehicles by which to achieve these 
goals, while in the latter central banks also have the autonomy to set the goals of 
monetary policy (Hall 2008, Walsh 1995). Central banks are, however, not 
‘independent’ when they are removed from democratic political control, but rather they 
must now respond to the demands of financial markets and those who operate them. 
Instead of being controlled by democratically elected politicians who can set monetary 
policy for social ends in the best interests of citizens, monetary policy is instead 
increasingly governed by the financial markets and the interests of financial capital 
(Epstein 2002:8,16).  
 
Neoliberal discourse argues that monetary policy is a purely technical matter and thus 
best handled by experts and technocrats. However, as Epstein has argued, a political 
economy analysis highlights that ‘the economy’ is inherently ‘political’ and that 
monetary policy is in fact a contested terrain of class conflict as finance, industry and 
labour all have different interests and different preferences regarding the goal of that 
policy (Epstein 2002).  Since the 1990s neoliberal theorists have put forth the 
argument that increasing the autonomy of central banks lowers inflation because 
central bankers, in contrast to democratically elected politicians, are less likely to be 
responsive to societal pressures that favour inflation, and can thus offer a credible, 
conservative and stable monetary policy that keeps inflation low without any adverse 
effects to the real economy (Rogoff 1985). However more recent research has shown 
that there is indeed an adverse effect to the real economy – in many cases, particularly 
in contexts of uncoordinated wage bargaining, the cost of this ‘inflation targeting’ is a 
rise in unemployment (Hall 1994, Hall & Franzese 1998). Thus monetary policy 
involves a trade-off between the interests of capital (who favour low inflation as it 
protects against asset depreciation) and the interests of labour (who favour high 
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employment). By insulating central bankers from democratic societal pressures, 
monetary policy ends up serving the interests of capital over those of labour (Epstein 
2002). 
 
Macroeconomic policy can also be redistributive. Governments that retain control of 
monetary policy and exchange rate controls can use macroeconomic policy to raise 
revenues to fund government services and transfers. They can, in effect, print money 
to fund government services. Thus, for example, many governments in Latin America 
such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Venezuela have turned to the use of seigniorage 
to finance budget deficits oriented towards the poor. Countries that forsake this 
possibility, however, and opt for central bank independence and the ensuing policies 
of ‘inflation targeting’ are not able to redistribute in this way and their macroeconomic 
policies tend instead to favour the elites (Albertus & Menaldo 2013). The point is that 
central bank policy is fundamentally political in that the outcomes of its policies have 
social consequences and affect different sectors of society differently. However the 
arrangement of central bank ‘independence’ means that the goals of monetary policy 
are effectively set by the interests of capital and that other interests are removed from 
the decision-making process (Epstein 2002).  
 
Central banks are not the only economic institutions that are being bracketed off from 
political control. In the late 1990s there were calls to extend this model of 
‘independence’ to other key policy areas, including even health and social welfare 
(Binder 1997). Whilst things have not (yet) progressed that far, a range of other 
economic and financial policy areas have become increasing ‘independent’ or 
‘autonomous’. Currency boards and sovereign debt management offices have largely 
followed the path of the central banks and been made increasingly ‘independent’ and 
thus are de-democratised in much the same way. This in turn means that in many 
countries’ polices regarding exchange rates and sovereign debt payments are being 
taken out of democratic control and instead being made in the interests of capital and 
the financial markets.  
 
In countries across the world there have been a raft of new constitutions and legal 
changes which act to legally, and permanently, separate the ‘economic’ from the 
‘political’. Whilst this is in no way a homogeneous process happening everywhere in 
the same way, it is a process that one way or another, and to differing degrees, is 
unfolding in very many countries. It is very common across Africa, where the World 
Bank and IMF have aggressively promoted the creation of autonomous enclaves 
within national bureaucracies, either in the form of increased ‘autonomy’ for Ministries 
of Finance or the placement of technocrats - often on the payroll of the IFIs – in key 
Ministries (Mkandawire 1999:127). And in Peru, to take just one example from the 
other side of the world, Teivainen has shown that after the transition to democracy and 
neoliberalism a new constitution was developed that defined various areas as 
‘economic’ or ‘financial’ and then legally insulated these areas from parliamentary 
control. In this way the Peruvian Ministry of the Economy was given more power and 
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at the same time it was increasingly shielded from democratic accountability, and in 
other ministries an increasing amount of policy-making was transferred to special 
teams which were insulated from public accountability (Teivainen 2002:22,133).  
 
Another way in which this has happened is through the new-style trade agreements 
that have become widespread in the post-1970s era. As trade has increased new legal 
structures to protect property rights have been developed and written into international 
trade agreements. Thus many WTO trade agreements, the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and other transnational trade agreements such as TRIPS and 
TRIMS, include provisions protecting the property rights of foreign capital over other 
rights. These rights are then insulated from present or future change as governments 
sign on their irreversibility. This means that future governments can be taken to private 
administrative tribunals and forced to pay for ‘loss of expected profits’ if they make 
laws or regulations for the public good that might impact on the future profitability of a 
corporation. In this way the political restructuring that is taking place today is being 
locked-in for the future, and thus also restricting the democratic ability of future 
generations (Gill 2002:56).  
 
Stephen Gill has called this process the “new constitutionalism” (Gill 1998, 2002). It is 
clearly reminiscent of the type of constitutional limits that Hayek proposed. It serves to 
insulate certain important economic matters from democratic rule and popular 
accountability and instead places them in the hands of transnational capital and the 
financial markets. Thus in these fundamental areas of economic policy the 
representation of capital is increased while that of labour is decreased. 
 
(2) Restrictions in possible policy options 
 
While other areas of macroeconomic policy remain formally in the control of governments, a 
number of changes in the post-1970s global political and economic order have led to 
restrictions in the policy options that are available to domestic policy-makers. These 
restrictions have come about in two main ways – by the shifting of certain aspects of policy 
making up to the global level, and by the disciplining influence of global capital.  
 
(a) Restrictions in policy options due to global governance 
 
It is well known that there are serious democratic deficits at the global level. The IFIs 
are not democratic organisations and in most of them countries are represented 
according to the amount of money that they put into the organisation. Thus low and 
middle income countries are seriously underrepresented in discussions that take place 
in these forums. The G7, and even the larger G20, also only represent a small number 
of countries and yet seek to make decisions that affect the global economy. And the 
unofficial transnational policy networks such as the World Economic Forum and the 
Trilateral Commission are based on membership by invitation and as such mainly 
consist of political elites from the rich countries, directors and CEOs of TNCs, and 
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people who are committed to neoliberal approaches. In short, capital is highly 
represented, while labour has very little voice at all, and rich countries are well 
represented while poorer countries have far less voice. At the global level economic 
governance is reminiscent of early nineteenth century European systems, where a 
small group of elites make decisions and the majority are disenfranchised.  
 
And yet it is in these networks, what Gill has called the ‘G7 nexus’, that broad economic 
policy consensus is formed that in turn shapes the discourse within which domestic 
governments can make economic policy. Whilst these global networks do not directly 
set policy themselves they define the discursive space in which domestic policies can 
be discussed. In this way non-democratic global policy processes significantly restrict 
and shape the policy options available to national level policy-makers. 
 
It is worth noting that very little of serious economic significance is actually discussed 
at the UN. This is particularly noteworthy because the UN, despite its many 
shortcomings, is the most democratic institution that exists at the global level. Whilst 
it can in no way be considered fully democratic, at least in the General Assembly and 
in ECOSOC there is representation based on one country, one vote. So at the very 
least low and middle income countries, and leaders not necessarily committed to 
neoliberalism, have an equal voice in discussions. And it is through the UN that these 
voices have in the past expressed alternative views about how the global economy 
should be organised and governed. For contrary to neoliberal discourse there are of 
course numerous alternatives regarding how to govern a globalizing economy. One 
view was presented to the UN by the G77 countries in the early 1970s, for example, 
regarding their ideas for a New International Economic Order. Here is not the place to 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of their proposals, although it is interesting to 
note that they included regulation of TNCs and forms of global redistribution to 
diminish inequality. What is important to note, I think, is that since then there has been 
no major discussion in any official global governance arena about alternative, non-
neoliberal, forms of globalisation. 
 
Instead, the rich countries have made continuous efforts to shift discussions about 
economic governance out of the UN to less democratic forums in order to maintain 
control of the outcomes. To give just one example, recent discussions about reforming 
elements of transnational tax policy, which as we shall see below is incredibly 
important for all countries, have taken place at the OECD with only rich countries 
represented, despite the calls of G77 countries to hold these discussions at the UN 
where they would also be represented.  
 
What is important for our discussion here is that global policy processes are 
increasingly restricting national level policy making, and that these global policy 
processes are severely undemocratic. This, then, is one way that national level policy 
making is becoming de-democratised. 
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(b) Restrictions in policy options due to the disciplining of global capital 
 
Another way that policy options have been restricted at the domestic level is by the 
dynamics created by the global mobility of capital. Instead of regulating capital for the 
good of society, governments are now forced to compete with each other to attract 
capital to their countries. They are thus induced to choose policies favourable to 
investors and TNCs and to demonstrate that they promote a good ‘business climate’. 
This has made it increasingly difficult for governments to pursue autonomous 
macroeconomic policy in a range of areas including exchange rates, interest rates, 
taxation and fiscal policy, as well as areas of social policy and labour policy (Held 
1997:257).  A whole ‘economic surveillance’ industry has developed with the IMF and 
the credit ratings agencies continually requesting economic data and information in 
order to analyse to what extent a particular country is ‘good for business’.  
 
The consequence of this is that governments have to increasingly set their economic 
policies to meet the wishes of these organisations which all follow a neoliberal 
approach which favours capital over other interests (Cox 1992, Gill 1998, Sassen 
1996).  In order to make themselves more attractive to capital countries are disciplined 
to lower corporate tax rates, reduce public spending and disempower unions so that 
labour can be made as cheap and as flexible as possible. This process of “disciplinary 
neoliberalism” (Gill 1998, 2002) has led to significant changes in all of these areas in 
very many countries in the post-1970s period. I will focus on changes in fiscal and 
social policy because these are particularly relevant for changing patterns of 
inequality. And since the dynamics are rather different in richer and poorer countries I 
will consider them separately. 
 
Rich Countries 
 
The combination of neoliberal ideology and global capital mobility has led to a major 
re-structuring of tax systems in most of the rich core countries. Average statutory 
corporate tax rates have fallen from around 50% in 1980 to around 30% in 2005, and 
further since then. At the same time the tax base has been broadened by reducing 
investment allowances, depreciations, and other deductions (Ganghof & Genschel 
2008:59, Rixen 2011). This restructuring has left overall tax revenues largely 
unchanged and this led early scholars to believe that global tax competition was not 
in fact undermining fiscal sovereignty (Plumper, Troeger & Winner 2009).  
 
However more recent and nuanced studies have questioned this earlier optimism and 
have showed that the restructuring was itself driven by competitive pressures and that 
the outcomes of this restructuring are far from neutral. Cutting top corporate tax rates 
and broadening the tax base has meant that the tax burden has been shifted from 
TNCs to nationally organized small- and medium-sized companies, and from mobile 
to immobile economic factors. In this way tax on labour has  increased, while tax on 
capital has fallen (Rixen 2011). Furthermore, since governments like to keep top 
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personal income tax rates broadly in line with corporate tax rates (in order to stop tax 
avoidance by individuals incorporating themselves in order to pay lower taxes), the tax 
restructuring has also led to a decline in top rate personal income tax, further reducing 
the tax burdens of the wealthy. Thus the post-1970s tax restructuring has had 
important distributive consequences. 
 
These policy changes have not been legitimately chosen by the states involved, but in 
most cases are rather forced upon them by competitive pressures in the globalising 
economy. In particular, governments are competing not only for foreign direct 
investment - real business activity – but also for ‘paper profits’ – profits that TNCs shift 
from one jurisdiction to another through all manner of, generally legal, accounting 
procedures. Several studies have shown that the mobility of  these ‘paper profits’ is 
highly sensitive to tax rates and thus that it is competition for this type of capital that is 
driving down corporate tax rates (Rixen 2011). Furthermore, as some countries set 
very low corporate tax rates and offer high degrees of secrecy, these ‘paper profits’ 
are increasingly being shifted to tax havens and thus eliding the tax man in any 
country. Thus while states still possess the formal right to set tax policies they cannot 
effectively pursue certain desired policy goals. In other words, tax competition 
undermines the fiscal self-determination of states and significantly reduces their ability 
to effectively set the size of the budget and the extent of redistribution (Dietsch & Rixen 
2012). 
 
Despite the relatively stable tax revenue in the post-1970s period, neoliberal reforms 
in social welfare policy have been common across the rich core countries (Castles 
2004, Huber and Stephens 2001, Swank 2002). In the post-1970s periods firms and 
their interest associations have lobbied governments for rollbacks and efficiency-
oriented reforms in national systems of social protection. They have argued that social 
programmes negatively affect profits, investment, and job creation and they have also 
used the threat of relocation to more favourable environments in order to put pressure 
on domestic policymakers. As I will discuss below, the ability of the private sector to 
influence government has significantly increased in the post-1970s period and thus 
changes have increasingly been made in the direction of their wishes. 
 
Nonetheless welfare states have not simply collapsed in the process, as many 
predicted (Garrett and Lange1995, Geyer 1998. Scharpf 2000, Steinmo 2002).  
Democracy has not entirely withered away and since welfare state cuts are extremely 
unpopular with the electorate in most countries the process of rolling them back has 
been slow and difficult. But nonetheless, there has been a widespread process of 
change and retrenchment from the 1980s onwards. As Huber and Stephens 
(2001:123) summarize, “We find that roll-backs and ‘restructurings’ in welfare state 
programmes have been a universal phenomenon in the past two decades.” Against 
earlier contentions that the welfare state was not changing (Pierson 1994), more 
recent studies have emphasisd the significant changes in social services, social policy 
administration, pensions, education, industrial relations and labour market policy that 
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have taken place in European countries since the 1980s (Hemerijck 2013). 
Governments have periodically reduced income replacement rates, tightened eligibility 
rules and limited benefit indexation for core social insurance programmes. They have 
also employed greater targeting of benefits and encouraged the expansion of private 
insurance against labour market risks. Health and other social service programmes 
have increasingly been subject to budget caps, user co-payments, internal markets 
and other efficiency-oriented reforms. And in the heightened austerity of the post-2008 
financial crisis era, where the public purse has run increasingly dry due to costly bank 
bail-outs and stimulus packages, welfare states are again facing more retrenchment 
as cuts are made to public services and transfers to the poor (Hemerijck 2013:9). 
 
Nonetheless there has not (yet) been a wholescale dismantling of the welfare state. 
Most significant roll backs have occurred in countries whose political institutions act 
against pro-welfare state coalitions, such as the Anglo liberal political economies 
(Swank 2005:187). Welfare states in Scandinavia and continental Europe, where 
organised labour has more power and where electoral systems based on proportional 
representation  more often lead to left wing governments,  have proved much more 
resilient against the pressures of globalisation (Brady, Beckfield & Zhao 2007, Esping-
Andersen 1996; Glatzer & Rueschemeyer 2005, Steinmo 2002, Swank 2002). Thus 
democracy has not been completely eroded, but the economic pressures of 
globalisation have clearly placed restrictions on fiscal and social policy and driven 
them in a certain direction in most of the rich countries. 
 
Poorer Countries 
 
In poorer countries things have been much worse and in particular tax competition has 
proved a much bigger problem. While developed countries have been able to maintain 
the size of the budget by broadening the tax base and compromising on the extent of 
redistribution, developing countries have not been able to prevent revenue losses 
(Dietsch & Rixen 2012). Since the 1990s their corporate tax revenues have been 
dramatically reduced as they have been forced to reduce corporate tax rates and offer 
tax holidays and other incentives in order to attract foreign investment, while not being 
able to broaden the tax base. Thus corporate tax revenues of developing countries 
declined from 2.9% of GDP in the early 1990s to only 2.3% of GDP in the early 2000s 
(Keen & Simone 2004). Furthermore, transnational tax avoidance strategies of 
transnational companies (TNCs) have made it increasingly difficult for all countries to 
collect tax from them, and in particular developing countries whose tax administrations 
generally have lower capacities than those of the developed countries. Based on a 
range of data it is estimated that developing countries lose tax revenue equivalent to 
20-30% of their actual tax income in this way (Mascagni, Moore & McCluskey 
2014:16). Christian Aid has suggested that the annual revenue loss of developing 
countries just from transfer pricing activities within TNCs is in the order of $160 billion 
(Christian Aid 2008). For comparison, the total amount of money given in development 
aid per year from all countries and international organisations is about $130 billion. 
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Over the same period developing countries have also seen significant reductions in 
revenue from trade taxes as they have reduced tariffs in line with liberalisation policies 
(Baunsgaard & Keen 2010). Combined this has led to significant shortfalls in the tax 
revenue collected by developing countries. While in OECD countries tax revenue is 
generally 30-40% of GDP, in developing countries it is only in the 10-20% range 
(Mascagni, Moore & McCluskey 2014:10). 
 
In this context of low tax revenue, developing country governments have been forced 
to either severely limit public spending or to take foreign loans to pay for it, or in many 
cases, a combination of the two. As a consequence public spending on infrastructure, 
service provision and welfare has plummeted in many countries since the 1980s 
(Rudra 2002, Wibbels 2006). At the same time, many countries have taken loans in 
order to ensure that at least a minimal public spending can continue. There has thus 
been a huge increase in the value of the sovereign debt of developing countries in this 
period.  
 
It is well known that the ability of governments in developing countries to set their own 
macroeconomic policies has long been restricted by the conditionalities attached to 
loans from the IMF and the World Bank, and that these conditionalities have forced 
such countries to open their economies and implement neoliberal policies. With the 
increasing levels of sovereign debt in the post-1970s period these dynamics have 
increased and also transformed as governments have increasingly begun to take 
loans from private commercial banks.  
 
A government’s ability to attract credit on the capital markets, and the cost of this 
credit, is largely determined by its credit rating. This is a rating that private credit ratings 
agencies, notably Moody’s and Standard and Poors (S&P), give to a country after 
assessing the risk that it will pay back loans. Most importantly, if a country’s credit 
rating goes down then the cost of interest on its debts will go up. Thus in the post-
1970s context of high indebtedness, developing country governments have been 
disciplined to enact policies that will please the ratings agencies. In this way private 
credit ratings agencies have become new sites of economic governance (Datz 2008, 
Sinclair 1994). Backed up by the prospect of loss of access to international credit 
markets and debilitating capital flight, the demands of the financial markets, filtered 
through the credit rating agencies, have seriously constrained the policy options 
available to many governments in low-and middle-income countries.  
 
The types of policies that please credit ratings agencies are those that prioritise 
interest payments on debt over other forms of government spending. In this way 
governments have been increasingly disciplined to impose austerity policies and 
reduce government spending. Robert Cox has noted how the Mexican government 
had to abandon an agricultural reform designed to expand medium-sized farming for 
local consumption goods, which would have been beneficial to many of its citizens, 
and instead revert to large scale production of luxury export crops in order to earn 
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dollars to service the country’s debt (Cox 1992).  Giselle Datz has argued that the 
Argentinian government’s attempts to please the ratings agencies in the 1990s was 
the main driver leading to the subsequent collapse of the Argentinian economy, 
recession, a ballooning of its national debt and  increased poverty and inequality (Datz 
2008). Laura Bear has shown that as interest payments on government loans in India 
rose from 18% to 29% of GNP in the 1980s and 90s the requirement to make the 
interest payments came to dominate economic policy, leading to the implementation 
of neoliberal reforms and austerity policies. Certain agencies of the public sector 
became sites of centralized accumulation as the government sought to suck resources 
from them in order to pay off their external debt. Thus the Kolkata Port Authority, where 
Bear focused her study, was disciplined into cutting costs by reducing the workforce, 
shifting to more precarious forms of labour employment and renting out land to the 
private sector in an effort to channel money to the central government. Across the 
government funds that could have been spent on public services or social provision 
were instead directed to pay off the external loans and maintain their credit rating (Bear 
2015).  
 
Another change in the nature of sovereign debt in the post-1970s period is that it has 
been increasingly financialised. It is now packaged and repackaged in different forms 
of securities and traded on the bond market. In this form it is divided and traded 
amongst multiple investors, many trading in a short term and speculative frame. As 
the value of the debt thus rises and falls according to the swings of the bond market, 
governments now find it difficult to renegotiate these debts when necessary, thus 
making economic management much more difficult. As a result, argues Laura Bear, 
“economic policy becomes focused on appearing as a well-behaved debtor to an 
atomized market place of multiple bond holders and debt-instrument investors” (Bear 
2015:12).  
 
Thus in all these ways developing countries have further lost their ability to determine 
their own macroeconomic, fiscal and social policies. 
 
(3) Reductions in democratic accountability in the policy making process 
 
A third way that economic governance has been significantly de-democratised in the 
post-1970s period has been by changes in the structure of domestic policy making 
itself. Neoliberalism and globalisation have led to major re-structurings of the public 
sector in many core countries and this has led to significant reductions in the 
democratic accountability of the policy-making process. 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s a number of observers began to argue that 
government had become ‘overloaded’ (Peters & Pierre 2006). In response Margaret 
Thatcher and other politicians started to ‘shed the load’ by privatising state-run 
businesses and by increasingly sub-contracting and outsourcing government service 
provision to the private sector. Another aspect of the ‘overloaded government’ debate 
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at the time was the argument that governments had become overloaded by the 
demands of their citizens. For example, the Trilateral Commission published a report 
in 1975 entitled The Crisis of Democracy which argued that as citizens had become 
more active and politically empowered they were demanding more services and more 
redistribution and this was posing a major challenge for governments (Crozier et al 
1975). The diagnosis of the report was that there was an ‘excess of democracy’ and 
therefore that the solution was to limit democracy. While the report did not specify how 
this was to be achieved, it is perhaps no coincidence therefore that both of the major 
changes that took place in the public sector in the following years had the effect of 
taking many areas of policy-making out of democratic control. 
 
Two new approaches were developed at this time - New Public Management Theory 
(NPM) and Governance theory. Both promoted their changes in the name of cost-
cutting and efficiency. NPM can be seen as an extension of neoliberal theory as 
applied to the public sector. It calls for governments to embrace private sector 
management strategies. One aspect of this has been the call to devolve decision-
making to smaller units, which can in turn compete against each other in order to 
reduce costs and improve efficiency. In effect it seeks to create internal markets within 
pubic administration (Osborne, & Gaebler 1992). But in moving decision making to the 
lower level of agencies, political oversight is greatly diminished. Whilst NPM theorists 
are aware of this issue, they justify their approach by claiming that it is the outputs that 
confer legitimacy, rather than democratic processes of accountability (Benz & 
Papadopoulos 2006:12). In their view citizens signal their choices as customers of 
services, rather than as citizens who vote. But in such a market-oriented view of 
representation citizens can choose between service providers, but they cannot vote 
for more or different services. And in the process the democratic accountability of 
elected representatives is severely reduced. 
 
Governance theory in turn advocated a shift to a more decentralised form of policy-
making whereby policy decisions would be made in collaboration with other 
stakeholders and non-state actors, particularly the private sector. The rationale for this 
change was that by engaging with a wider range of stakeholders the public sector 
would be able to mobilise private sector resources in pursuit of common goals. This 
has led to a shift from centralised decision-making by government to dispersed 
decision-making in policy networks in which government officials participate alongside 
representatives from TNCs, business associations and civil society groups (Peters & 
Pierre 1998:226). In practice, this has led to a situation where policy decisions are 
increasingly made in forums that are not subject to democratic or parliamentary 
scrutiny. At the same time it has led to a situation in which the private sector has 
become directly involved in public decision-making (Benz & Papadopoulos 2006:20).   
 
While some have argued that this new form of policy-making is in fact more democratic 
than top-down government – because a wider range of stakeholders are involved, 
including also NGOs, consumer groups and other elements of civil society – it must 
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be remembered that the resources available to large companies, TNCs and business 
associations to engage in these processes is far, far greater than that available to civil 
society groups, many of which are poorly funded and under-resourced. As one 
commentator noted, it is like lining up rowing boats against battle ships. Rather the 
shift to decision-making in multi-stakeholder policy networks has led to an increased 
representation of the private sector, and thus of capital, in the policy making process. 
 
In the 1990s the move to de-politicise policy-making went even further and there were 
calls for  policy to be made in ‘non-majoritarian institutions’ and for ‘experts’ to be 
increasingly involved in the policy process specifically because they were non-partisan 
and not accountable to the electorate (Mair 2006:27). At the same time there was an 
attempt to redefine democracy and to separate its constitutional and popular 
components, both in theory and in practice. Whilst much emphasis was given to the 
constitutional component, such as appropriate checks and balances across 
institutions and the role of courts and judges, the popular component, namely 
accountability to the people, was de-emphasised and rendered increasingly 
unimportant. Democracy was in effect de-democratised, or in Mair’s terms, it was 
increasingly “stripped of its popular component”, leading to “democracy without a 
demos” (Mair 2006:25) 
 
In developing countries the situation is again much worse. Here government’s role in 
policy-making has been reduced not by big business or by experts, but by the 
international financial organisations (IFIs) who often directly influence and shape the 
structure and functioning of the public sector. The World Bank and IMF routinely 
interfere in domestic policy making across the African continent, most notoriously 
through their Structural Adjustment Programmes from the 1980s onwards. Himbara 
and Sultan, for example, have argued that though the implementation of structural 
adjustment in Uganda “donor control has extended over the full range of policy 
mechanisms, feasibility research, project implementations and management of key 
elements of the Ugandan state'” (Himbara & Sultan 1995: 90).  
 
Anthropologist Gerhard Anders has shown how the involvement of these IFIs in 
domestic policy-making has only increased since then, particularly since the 1990s 
when matters of ‘good governance’ were included as part of IMF loan conditionality 
(Anders 2009). He documents how it was the IFIs who set the agenda for civil service 
reform in Malawi, rather than the Malawian government. And he shows in great detail 
how Malawi’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – a government policy document – 
was in effect written by World Bank and IMF staff, after several locally-produced 
versions were rejected by these organisations. He concludes that, in Malawi “national 
policy is rarely the product of the sovereign government or the national legislature” 
(Anders 2009: 47). Similar stories are found across the African continent, leading to 
what Thandika Mkandawire has called “choiceless democracies” – countries that are 
in theory democracies, but where the only possible policy option is that dictated by the 
IFIs (Mkandawire 1999). 
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4. Conclusion 
 
All of the changes discussed in this paper add up to an extremely significant 
transformation in the nature of policy making, political representative and democracy. 
The policy-making prerogative of states has been redistributed ‘up’ to the 
supranational level, ‘down’ to lower state levels and ‘across’ to the market (Yeates 
2001:11). And in contrast to the state, these new arenas of decision-making are largely 
insulated from democratic control. In this way economic issues have been de-
politicised and increasingly removed from the arena of electoral politics. Furthermore, 
in each of the shifts that I have discussed the representation of capital in economic 
policy-making has been significantly increased, while that of labour has been 
correspondingly decreased. Thus I would contend that we not just seeing a 
transformation of democracy, as some scholars have argued, but rather that we are 
witnessing a process of de-democratisation and a shift towards elite rule. 
 
And it is this process of de-democratisation, I argue, that is the fundamental underlying 
cause behind the recent increase in economic inequality that has taken place since 
the 1970s in so many countries of the world. I have tried to show how the trinity of 
neoliberalism, globalisation and financialisation have led to the situation where the 
‘economic’ has been increasingly separated from the ‘political’. I have also argued that 
this has not happened by accident, but that the ‘limitation of democracy’ – or what I 
call de-democratisation - is something that is fundamental in the thought of Hayek and 
other neoliberal thinkers. It is both desired and necessary in order to facilitate the 
further expansion of capitalism and to enable greater capital accumulation. The shift 
towards the increasing representation of capital in economic decision-making, and the 
decreasing representation of labour, has unsurprisingly led to economic policies being 
made increasingly in the interests of capital. In this way the class compromise of the 
post-war period has been undermined. These structural, political changes, I contend, 
are the fundamental reasons that underlie many of the more proximate causes of the 
upswing in inequality.  
 
This analysis thus has major implications for how we should go about tackling the 
contemporary rise in inequality. It suggests that the problem, and therefore the 
solution, is fundamentally political, rather than technical. Therefore in order to bring 
about any significant and sustained process of reducing inequality it is imperative to 
find ways to bring about major political reform of the global system. First and foremost 
it is imperative to find ways to democratise economic policy making at both the national 
and the global level, and then to push for these changes to be implemented.  
 
As such I would suggest that policy-oriented academics who are interested in devising 
ways to reduce inequality should start to focus on creating models for new kinds of 
democratic governance at both the national and global levels. This could involve, for 
example, bringing policy-making back from decentralised networks and into state 
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structures at the national level, alongside the creation of state-like structures at the 
global level which would be able to regulate global capital for the good of society and 
through which policy alternatives, such as, for example, global social democracy, 
could be democratically debated - possibly in some sort of global parliament. Or it 
could involve devising ways to democratise de-centralised policy-making in national 
and global policy networks and in national and international financial organisations. 
There are, no doubt, many other possibilities and scholarship in this area is still 
extremely nascent. Whilst there is a small group of scholars working in the field of 
global democracy (eg. Archibugi, Held, Koenig-Archibugi, Marchetti) their work is 
currently not read or engaged with by scholars of inequality. Bringing these two groups 
of scholars together would be important and fruitful. 
 
Devising models is one thing, getting them implemented is another. As this paper has 
argued, we are talking about a new chapter in the struggle between capital and labour. 
Thus I would suggest that there is an important role to be played by civil society and 
trade unions to make people aware of these processes of de-democratisation and to 
organise transnationally, not just around particular issues, but to push for institutional 
change and the wholesale democratisation of global governance. Because it is only 
by stopping the current process of de-democratisation and initiating a counter process 
of (re)-democratisation that it may be possible to reverse the current inequality trends. 
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